Con Sergio Peláez acabamos de enviar a revisión de pares un artículo en el cual analizamos los efectos de mercado producidos por las multas contra carteles impuestas por la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio a empresas del sector manufacturero en el periodo 2012 – 2020.

Les comparto la información básica sobre el paper que está disponible en versión pre-print para recibir comentarios y retroalimentación:

The Gradual Impact of Sanctioning Cartels on Market Competition: Evidence from the Colombian Manufacturing Sector

Abstract: This paper examines the market effects of fines imposed on hard-core cartels by the Colombian competition agency. We find that the fines had a positive and gradual impact on market competition in the manufacturing sector from 2012 to 2020. This suggests that the fines deterred cartel behavior but also that some implicit agreements take time to fade away. To measure market competition, we use the complement of a Lerner index, while an indicator variable is employed to capture the differential timing and sectors of fines imposed by the agency across various industries and years. Our data sources are a manufacturing census from the national department of statistics and public records of cartel cases from the agency. Our panel data consists of 67,671 observations for 10,316 firms over nine years. We employ a difference-in-differences (DID) method with multiple periods following Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) and conduct robustness checks using Gardner (2021) and allowing for anticipation effects.

JEL codes: K21 – Antitrust Law, L41 – Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices, L60 – Industry Studies: Manufacturing, C23 – Panel Data Models; Spatio-temporal Models, D22 – Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis

Citación sugerida: Sergio Pelaez, Juan David Gutiérrez. The Gradual Impact of Sanctioning Cartels on Market Competition: Evidence from the Colombian Manufacturing Sector, 16 May 2023, PREPRINT (Version 1) available at Research Square [https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2928151/v1]